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Recommendations on electrification policy II 
Executive summary 
This document details a set of proposals for a new system of electrification planning and 
financing. Key issues facing electrification policy in South Africa are identified. Policy 
options are examined in a systematic manner, and recommendations made. The focus is 
on the design of an appropriate institutional and financing framework to support the 
national electrification programme, with some discussion on ·guidelines for resource 
allocation. 
The policy issues 
Electrification financing is currently dependent on cross-subsidies within individual 
distributors. Combined with the current structure of the industry this has lead to a 
number of distortions in the electrification programme. The resource allocation system, 
dominated by cross-subsidies within Eskom, is biased towards rural areas and against 
off-grid technologies. The supply rights system means that Eskom's resources benefit 
only those areas supplied by Eskom. The fragmented distribution industry results in a 
proliferation of tariffs which do not reflect costs systematically, and there is evidence of 
inefficiencies within the industry. Finally, incentives to continue the electrification 
programme rely on a tacit understanding between government and utilities which is 
highly vulnerable to both political and financial pressures. 
Lack of 
incentives 
"Locked-in" 
cross-subsidies 
Structural reform 
Grid bias 
in distribution industry 
Rural bias 
Fragmented 
tariff system 
Inefficiencies 
in distribution 
Reform in electrification 
financing arrangements 
II 
It is clear that many of these issues can only be resolved if the distribution industry 
structure is rationalised. Furthermore, it is clear that such a rationalisation, although 
necessary, will be insufficient in itself. Attention must also be paid to the design of new 
electrification financing mechanisms and associated institutional arrangements. A 
rationalised distribution industry makes new electrification options possible, but d0es 
not automatically solve the existing problems. 
The options for electrification financing 
Assuming that the distribution industry will be rationalised, it is necessary to consider 
what forms electrification financing could take. Three types of financing requirements 
exist: capital for investment in commercial projects, capital for investment in non-
commercial projects (or the non-commercial element of projects). and funds to cover 
operating losses arising from (mainly rural) electrification projects. Clearly, commercial 
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projects can be financed from commercial sources, with possible interventions required 
from the DBSA or Eskom during the period of structural change. It is the subsidy 
element of electrification projects which poses special difficulties . 
. There are three possible financing mechanjsms for sub.~idising the capital costs of 
electrification. Firstly, there is the option of internal cross-subsidies within the 
electricity supply . industry - Hie- system -used_ at present. Secondly, a dedicated 
electrification levy may be introduced, to be admini·stered by Government or the 
industry. Thirdly; Hscai allocations may be provided for electrification. · · ··- · ·· ·· · 
Funding of capital subsidies 
Internal cross-
subsidies 
·\. 
Within one Transfer pricing 
national distributor between utilities 
Fiscal 
allocations 
Dedicated 
levy 
Administered by 
Government 
Administered by 
industry 
Requires new form of 
Govt. revenue - · 
truces. dividends 
The system of internal cross-subsidisation is neither transparent nor equitable, as it 
concentrates subsidies within individual utilities. Although it is possible to refine the 
system through the use of transfer pricing at the bulk supply level, this method does not 
substantially improve transparency, accountability or remove the bias away from off-
grid technologies. 
A dedicated levy - effectively an electrification fund . - may meet the criteria of 
transparency, accountability and technological neutrality, but may prove difficult to 
implement. In addition, there is likely to be resistance to a fund and levy which does not 
directly benefit those who contribute to it. Further, the establishment of a dedicated levy 
and fund would require .new institutions capable of administering and allocating the 
resources. 
A system of fiscal allocations . to electrification is therefore recommended as the 
preferred option as it provides for transparency and accountability, and allows for funds 
to be allocated according to Government's electrification policies. Furthermore, this 
system ensures that the electrification programme will compete for funding along with 
other demands on the Government's budget and so should find its appropriate position 
in the ranking of national priorities. 
Since this system will require additional Government expenditure it will have to be 
matched by addition revenue. Two primary options exist here: the application of 
company tax and dividend payments to the electricity industry (Eskom would provide 
the bulk of the requirements with a 35% companies' tax and 33% dividend); or a special 
tax on electricity (a levy). Taxation and dividends is the recommended option as it 
removes current market distortions in the energy markets (i.e. it "levels the playing 
fields" between different fuel sources, and facilitates the introduction of new 
participants in the power generation industry). In addition, the introduction of these 
changes may form part of a policy package for all public enterprises which may be 
implemented regardless of electrification considerations. 
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Options for funding operating losses on electrification projects are: 
• to increase electrification tariffs; I • to i1ncrease capital subsidies to reflect the present value of future operating. losses: 
• to use industry-wide cross-subsi.dies .and manage ~.ransfers between distributors; and 
I • to use cross-subsidres. within a diistribuloti's customer base (aH customers or only d.omestic customers). . _ 
----~un--c<>a.£1.ic.tJ;_witbJhe.-obj~ct-i·v_c;-of1fCfttevmg standard domestic tariffs. The 
I . second option is impractical as it requires estimation of a very uncertain quantity. The third option requires detailed reporting of electrification costs (and the apportioning of 
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overhead costs to electrification) and is potentially open to abuse. The last option, that 
of allowing distributors to set tariffs (preferably only domestic tariffs) to cover operating 
losses is the preferred option. 
Institutional a"angements for allocating subsidies 
Institutional arrangements for allocating grant subsidies to electrification are closely 
linked to the financing mechanism employed. Essentially there is a choice between off-
budget or on-budget financing. 
H off-budget financing is employed, i.e. electrification financing is kept within the 
electricity supply industry, then the institutional arrangements will depend on the 
structure of the distribution industry itself. In the case of a national distribution 
monopoly, it is likely that no new institutional arrangements will be necessary. If 
regional distributors are established, it will be necessary to use transfer pricing at the 
bulk level to effect financial transfers between distributors. This would require some 
form of regulation, and it is likely that the NER would be best placed to fulfil this 
function. 
Alternatively, if the option of financing through the Government budget is implemented, 
then some institutional capacity will be required to allocate the funds. The choice is 
between using existing institutions (such as the DMEA, electricity utilities, the NER, the 
DBSA etc.), or creating a new agency (a "National Electrification Agency"). The 
preferred choice is for the DMEA to take prime responsibility for allocating the funds. 
However, capacity constraints within the DMEA may make this option impractical. 
Consequently, the DMEA may choose to create a suitable agency to undertake this task 
(an NEA), or to sub-contract much of the administration to another organisation, such as 
the DBSA. This arrangement could provide greater development benefits through cross 
sectoral integration within the Development Bank. 
Institutions and grant finance 
Within the 
ESI 
National eleclticity 
distributor 
EDRC & MEPC 
Regional electricity 
distributors 
I . 
• NER manages transfers 
DMEA 
Through 
Government 
· Existing agent 
I DBSA 
SER Utiliiies 
New agent 
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Summary of recommendations 
This paper recommends that a set of institutional and financing arrangements be adopted 
to ensure that the electrification programme continues withour adverse financial 
implications for utilities. In essence, 'the recommendations assume that the distribution 
industry will be rationalised and that new subsidy mechanisms and associated 
institutional arrangements will be created. 
The main elements of the recommendations follow. 
• Electrification capital costs should be subsidised-through fiscal allocations. 
• . Operating losses on electrification projects should be met through cross-subsidies 
within the domestic consumer base of each utility. 
• The disbursement of capital funds should be the responsibility of the DMEA, with 
contracted assistance from other institutions, such as the DBSA. 
• This additional Government expenditure should be matched by additional revenue 
from the taxation of the electricity industry and, if this is inadequate, the imposition 
of a special levy on electricity sales. 
Implementation of these recommendations will entail restructuring of financing and 
institutional arrangements, and clearly there is much detail to be filled in. Nonetheless 
the main objective of this investigation has been achieved in proposing an electrification 
policy framework and demonstrating that it is both desirable and workable. In short, we 
believe that the implementation of these recommendations will lead to an appropriate 
distribution of power. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper forms part of the research project 'Electrification planning: A review with 
suggestions for alternative models'. The project was undertaken by the Minerals and 
Energy Policy Centre (MEPC) and the Energy and Development Research Centre 
(EDRC). The project was funded by the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
(DMEA), the DBSA, Eskom and the National Electricity Regulator (NER). 
The research has examined electrification planning in South Africa in a systematic and 
broad manner. A. number of activities have been undertaken by the research team 
including the following: 
• A literature review of electrification planning in other countries; 
• A review of stakeholder attitudes towards electrification planning: 
• Financial modelling of household electrification; and 
• Scenario planning for the electricity supply industry, through a series of participatory 
workshops. 
The purpose of this paper is to utilise the information and insights gathered during the 
research process to prepare a set of proposals for a new system of electrification 
planning in South Africa. These proposals are based on an analysis of the key 
constraints, opportunities and tasks facing the industry and Government, and take 
cognisance of the current status of debate regarding these issues. 
The focus of this paper is on financing mechanisms and institutional arrangements for 
electrification, particularly grid extension by distribution utilities. Although it is 
recognised that off-grid systems, and in particular photovoltaic systems, are important 
technologies in the supply of electricity to rural communities, they are not accorded as 
much attention. This is a consequence of the limited experience with publicly supported 
photovoltaic dissemination projects and the variety of proposed, but largely untested, 
approaches to off-grid electrification. Despite this lack of experience, efforts have been 
made to design electrification policies which are flexible enough to incorporate off-grid 
systems once implementation strategies are agreed on. 
The paper commences by summarising the current status of institutional and financing 
arrangements in the electricity supply industry (ESI), and then presents an analysis of 
the central problems inherent to these arrangements. This is followed by a discussion of 
. the financing and institutional options available to support electrification. Financing 
issues define the requirements of electrification and must be understood prior to 
recommending mechanisms to meet these requirements. Arrangements to channel public 
support for electrification are then considered as part of institutional issues, as well as 
the allocation of subsidies, the monitoring of the electrification programme and, lastly, 
the evaluation and reformulation of electrification policies. 
2. Background 
This section outlines existing institutional arrangements in the South African ESL This 
is followed by a discussion of the problems currently faced by the distribution industry 
and how these problems affect electrification planning. 
2.1 Current institutional arrangements 
Institutional arrangements in the ESI are currently under transition. Figure t illustrates 
the institutional structure prior to the initiation of structural changes in the industry. 
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The electricity industry is largely dominated by Eskom, which owns 92% of generation 
capacity (Eskom 1994). owns and operates the national transmission system, and 
distributes electricity to 1.2 million end-users - approximately one-third of all electricity 
consumers in the country (NER database). Not only does Eskom dominate the ESI, but 
it also plays a significant role in the national economy. As a portion of GDFl 1, Eskom's 
investments accounted for a peak of 15% in 1985. Although this has since declined to 
7% in 1990, it still represents a significant portion of the total GDFI. Eskom's influence 
on the financial markets is also significant since operations are financed through a 
combination of retained earnings and debt. In 1995. Eskom's net debt totalled 
R27 billion, and the "Eskom 168" bond is a benchmark in the markets, trading at a rate 
close to that of Government stock. As an employer, Eskom has reduced its level of 
employment from a peak of 66 000 to 40 000 over the past ten years. 
r 
GENERATION 
Homeland 
utilities 
Eskom · 
....... r - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - . - . 
I TRANSMISSION c------
,.._,__,,_,.., 
Municipal 
electricity depts 
1 
Eskom 
.... <! ........................... . I ~~;TR/BUT/ON . 
Homeland 
utilities 
Public works 
departments I I Municipal '---E-sk_o_m_· _ __. electricity depts 
Figure 1: institutional arrangemEmts prior to restructuring 
•. 
Genera.ti.on and transmission 
Although Eskom does not enjoy a statutory monopoly over generation, it has a de.facto 
monopoly. In 1995 it produced 96% of electricity in the country (Eskom 1995). Some 
municipal electricity departments still own and operate relatively small generation 
facilities (Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Pretoria). Of 
the former homeland utilities, only Teskor in the Transkei had any operational 
generation equipment (hydropower), which has now been transferred to Eskom. 
Electricity transmission through the national grid is the responsibility of Eskom and a11 
distributors purchase most, if not all, of their power requirements from Eskom. At 
present self-generators (a few municipalities and some private enterprises) consume all 
their production within their own distribution networks or on site without wheeling it 
through Eskom' s grid. · 
Within the generation and transmission sectors, it is widely expected that, at least in the 
medium term, Eskom will continue to act as a de facto monopoly business. Eskom has 
been given the task of absorbing former homeland utilities within its structure. 
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment 
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Distribution 
The distribution industry has always been, and continues to be, highly fragmented. 
Local authorities have traditionally had the right to supply electricity within their area of 
jurisdiction, and the new constitution defines electricity distribution as a local 
government competency (South Africa 1996). However,. distribution rights are 
contingent on obtaining a licence from the National Electricity Regulator (NER), which 
has the power (with good cause) to allocate local authorities' distribution rights to other 
entities. 
In 1995, one of the first tasks of the newly formed NER was to issue licences for all 
generation, transmission and distribution undertakings. Although generation and 
transmission licences were issued without significant changes or disputes, the issuing of 
distribution licences was more complex. Prior to the licensing round, electricity 
distribution throughout the country was divided between approximately 400 bodies. In 
urban areas, the complexity of former race-based local authorities was reflected in 
electricity distribution arrangements. In rural areas, distribution rights were divided 
between Eskom, former homeland utilities, government departments, provincial 
authorities and joint service boards. Given this complex and unsatisfactory 
arrangement, the NER was reduced to issuing temporary licences pending a policy 
decision by Government on how to tackle rationalising the distribution industry. 
Consequently, in September 1995, 398 electricity distributors were licensed for nine 
months (these licences have now been renewed for a further eighteen months) and the 
composition of this group is shown in Table 1. ·The licensing round did serve to effect 
some rationalisation, with single licences being issued for the metropoles and local 
government areas, unless Eskom applied (usually in the case of townships served by 
Eskom) in which case Eskom was licensed (Morgan 1996)2• 
Number 
1 
362 
7 
7 
5 
3 
13 
Table 1 : Electricity distributors in South Africa 
(Source: Trol/ip 1996) 
Institutions 
Eskom 
Local authorities J' 
Joint service boards, regional councils 
I 
Provinces 
Former homeland & self-governing territory utilities 
. 
National government distribution 
Privately owned (mostly sett supply) 
398 TOTAL 
2.2 Problems in the distribution industry 
It is in the distribution industry that major institutional reform is expected, and it is 
worth tracing the history of the debates relating to this topic. The 1922 Electricity Act 
which established what is now known as Eskom also put in place a rudimentary 
regulatory structure. The Electricity Control Board was given the responsibility of 
licensing electricity undertakings and approving tariffs of licensed undertakings. 
In metropolitan areas. a single licence was issued and the metropolitan authority was then able to 
allocate supply responsibilities to the various substructures. The only exception to this case was 
the Cape Metropole where boundaries had not been defined at the time of licensing. 
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However, municipal electricity departments were excluded from the requirement to 
obtain a licence and so were effectively excluded from the regulatory ambit of the 
Board. Municipalities were also awarded the first right to supply within their own area 
of jurisdiction. 
The roots of the current fragmentation of the distribution industry and the historical 
unequal distribution of access to electricity can be found in this regulatory system, 
together with the apartheid system of separate development. 
The first effect has clearly been the entrenchment of electricity distribution as a function 
of local government. From early days, most municipalities have exercised their powers 
to reticulate electricity and this power (or right) has been confirmed in the new 
constitution3. 
Secondly, and equally clearly, the system has been responsible for the inequitable access 
to electricity. Apartheid, as applied to urban areas4 meant that local authorities had 
electricity departments which generally served only their racially-based areas of 
jurisdiction. Former white local authorities were relieved of the responsibility of 
providing electricity to neighbouring black residential areas. Government systems 
established to serve these neighbouring townships failed to invest adequately in service 
provision, either due to a lack of political will, or as a consequence of inadequate 
technical and financial resources. In rural areas, the establishment of homelands and 
self-governing territories was accompanied by the rights of electricity supply being 
. allocated either to the governing authorities of these areas, or to new utilities. As in 
urban areas, electrification has been hampered by either a lack of political will or 
inadequate finaneial resources. In contrast, commercial farms in non-homeland rural 
areas were relatively effectively served by Eskom through the use of extensive cross-
subsidies from the general customer base. Arrangements in both urban and rural areas 
thus acted to Jock resources out of areas where electrification was required. Black urban 
areas as well as homelands were not served by institutions which could utilise the 
revenue base of major industrial, commercial and affluent domestic consumers to extend 
electricity supply. 
Thirdly, the regulatory system left tariffs of municipal diStributors under the control of 
local councils. Although this may be justified in terms ofjaccountability through elected 
bodies, it made it possible for municipalities to use electricity distribution as a cash-cow 
in order to supplement rates revenue. Although it may 0e argued that this is, in effect, 
not substantially different from other forms of local government taxation, it has meant 
that local authorities are now dependent on extracting substantial resources from 
electricity distribution. 
These consequences of the governance environment have had direct implications for the 
implementation of a national electrification programme. Firstly, there has been a bias 
towards rural projects and away from off-grid supply technologies. Secondly, access to 
financing and cross-subsidies is unevenly distributed across the country. Lastly, the 
fragmented nature of the industry has meant that there is a proliferation of tariffs and 
possible poor operating efficiencies in local government electricity departments. Each 
of these is described in more detail below. 
Electricity distribution is listed as a local government competency in the new Constitution (in its 
present form still a bill) (South Africa 1996). 
As implemented through the Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945 and the 
Group Areas Act of 1950. 
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The rural bias 
The fragmentation of supply rights has meant that Eskom. which has had the most 
resources to target at electrification. has largely been excluded from urban areas. 
Consequently, the electrification programme over the past few years has had a strong 
rural focus. Although it may be argued that electrification will have to reach into rural 
areas at some stage, the current level of resource allocation to rural areas is largely a 
product of the supply rights system, rather than a consequence of an explicit policy 
decision. The alternative scenario, where electrification projects are prioritised on the 
basis of least cost (or maximum net present value), would inevitably mean a greater 
focus on urban sites earlier in the programme, and would represent a more rational 
allocation of resources. 
As a consequence of this bias, the electrification programme is being forced to deal with 
the peculiar stresses which rural electrification imposes. High connection costs. 
extremely low consumption rates, and reduced scope for wider economic benefits are all 
features of rural electrification. International experience has tended towards a more 
circumspect view of rural electrification. The extensive benefits that were once 
anticipated have, in general, failed to materialise and strategies have focused on the need 
to carefully select projects, co-ordinate electrification with other development projects 
and promote a demand-driven rather than supply-driven grid expansion programme in 
rural areas. 
Off-grid electricity systems 
Not only does the present system mean that Eskom' resources are not available to all 
areas of the country, but that Eskom's electrification funds are earmarked exclusively 
for grid extension, without adequate consideration of off-grid systems. Although solar 
home systems may represent a lower-cost alternative to grid extension in many rural 
areas, Eskom' s tendency to define its technical competencies as electricity provision 
through the grid has meant that these systems have not been utilised. However, the 
recent establishment of a Non-Grid Electricity section within Eskom may mark a change 
in approach. Despite this, off-grid electrification thus far has been concerned 
exclusively with rural school and clinic electrification and has used grant finance rather 
than Eskom's own investment resources to do this. Further, the Non-Grid Electricity 
section is not institutionally linked to Eskom's Distribution Division, further decreasing 
the opportunities for integrating off-grid systems into the electrification programme. 
It is ironic that the very institutional arrangements which have promoted the rural bias in 
the electrification programme have militated against the use of off-grid technologies. 
Solar home systems are advantaged, in cost terms, where communities are small, remote 
and settlement patterns dispersed. Consequently, an electrification programme with a 
rural focus would benefit from the inclusion of off-grid technologies. 
Access to financing and cross-subsidies 
The present institutional system has lead to inequitable access to financing resources for 
electrification. Eskom, as an extremely large utility with a de facto monopoly and a 
healthy balance sheet, is able to raise capital for electrification projects easily, either 
from retained earnings or at good rates on the capital markets. Municipal electricity 
departments are in a much weaker position to raise capital. partly because of their 
position as municipal authorities. and partly because of their limited revenue base. The 
situation is exacerbated for the smaller towns where the investment requirements, as a 
proportion of their asset and revenue base. are that much higher. 
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Related to this is the differing ability of Eskom and municipal authorities to lever cross-
subsidies from other consumers to cover losses on electrification projects. For Eskom. 
an operating shortfall of say R20 per electrification customer per month is fairly easily 
covered by surpluses made on other electricity sales. The cross-subsidy is available and 
unlikely to ~ignificantly affect Eskom's financial position or ability to raise debt. For 
municipalities, cross-subsidies are that much harder to lever and sustain. In fact, 
municipal electricity distributors are keenly aware of the fact that they are required to 
cover the costs of their own electrification projects, as well as contributing towards 
Eskom's surplus which is then used to cross-subsidise Eskom's electrification projects 
(Davidson 1995). 
The financing constraint faced by municipal distributors is further compounded by the 
dependence of other services on existing surpluses in the electricity industry. Municipal 
distributors generate a surplus of around R 1.7 billion per annum (Mountain 1995). If 
this surplus continues to be eroded by losses on electrification projects, local authorities 
will undoubtedly face a financial crisis. The impact of this would be particularly severe 
at_ a time when local authorities are expected to be actively involved in extending and 
improving a range of services to all residential areas within the new local government 
boundaries. 
Tariffs 
The fragmentation of the distribution industry is matched by a proliferation of tariffs. 
Tariff levels vary by over 200% in all consumer categories as shown in Table 2. 
Although part of these price variations can be explained in tenns of cost differences, it is 
almost certain that the main cause of variation is due to differing surplus revenue 
requirements of municipalities. This tariff system is undesirable from both an economic 
perspective, since it distorts electricity markets, and from an equity perspective, 
particularly in the domestic sector. 
Table 2: Tariff range by consumer category [c/kWh - 1994] 
(Source: EWG 1996a) 
category Minimum Maximum Mean Range/Mean 
Domestic 9 48 17 230% 
Mining 6 33 12 230% 
Industrial 4 52 13 360% . 
Commercial 8 48 17 "240% 
Efficiency 
It has been speculated that the fragmentation of the electricity distribution industry is a 
cause of inefficiency in the industry. Although it is not necessarily true that local 
distribution agencies are inherently less efficient than larger agencies, there is some 
evidence to indicate that many municipal distributors are too small to reap possible 
economies of scale. Distribution costs among municipal agencies vary by nearly 50%, 
with a clear trend towards lower costs for larger distributors. Although most of this 
variation is due to the differences in the cost of purchased energy, the variation in other 
distribution costs, although small in absolute terms, is equally broad in percentage 
tenns, as shown in Figure 2. Although these results do not mean that rationalisation will 
inevitably lead to efficiency gains (as the causes of the variations in costs are not clear), 
they do indicate that there are possible gains. 
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Reform in the institutional, financial and governance framework for electrification 
should meet five requirements. It should (1) provide incentives for utilities to embark 
on electrification; (2) ensure. the transition does not disrupt current electrification 
programmes, makes use of existing strengths, and recognises resource and capacity 
constraints; (3) provide clarity on the roles of different institutions; (4) ensure 
transparency of funding arrangements and a pricing policy which supports cost-
reflective tariffs; and1 (5) ensure that the programme is monitored and the evaluations fed 
back into an effectiJe policy formulation process. Each of these issues is dealt with in 
;3) 
more detail below. 
l 
., 
3. 1 Electrification incentives 
Utilities require incentives to embark on electrification and to develop innovative 
approaches to electrification. There is a clear conflict of interest between efforts to 
commercialise public utilities, and the pressure to implement unsubsidised 
electrification projects. It is important that electrification planning proposals address 
this conflict directly, and provide incentives for utilities to embark on electrification 
without compromising commercial practices or threatening financial viability. 
The provision of subsidies is the obvious solution to this dilemma. The question is 
whether such subsidies are pro\'ided through the fiscus, or as cross-subsidies within the 
industry. To be effective subsidies need to be associated with targets. In effect targets 
and subsidies are two sides of the same coin - a target requires a subsidy to be 
achievable, and subsidies can only be provided on the basis of targets. 
The provision of subsidies needs to be carefully balanced against the need to encourage 
utilities to innovate and adopt cost-minimising strategies. Subsidies which remove risk 
altogether are undesirable, as they are likely to be abused. Consequently, subsidies 
should be designed to share risk and to encourage implementation strategies which 
utilise subsidy resources carefully. 
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One of the advantages of adopting targets in an electrification programme is that they 
introduce a requirement that medium-term planning be undertaken, in order to provide 
targets with some substance. This, in turn, provides some certainty around the future of 
electrification. In addition, targets assist in motivating utilities and provide benchmarks 
against which performance can be evaluated. 
One the other hand, targets may focus attention on meeting simplistic evaluation criteria 
(i.e. number of connections), without adequately considering the impacts of the 
programme. Consequently, it is important that monitoring and evaluation adopt a more 
sophisticated approach than merely counting numbers of connections, and attempts 
should be made to examine the other, and often less tangible, impacts of electrification. 
Targets, and the nature of planning associated with them, necessarily entail a delivery 
programme that is supply driven. To a certain extent, this is inevitable in a network 
where individual projects are inter-related and the costs of future projects are partly 
dependent on the implementation of other projects. To overcome this problem targets 
should be combined with a planning procedure which includes demand-driven elements, 
allowing a "bottom-up" planning procedure to be matched to "top-do~n" targets and 
financing arrangements. 
' Lastly, it is important that targets are not inflexible and that they recognise the 
associated financing and capacity limitations. Targets should be designed with 
opportunities to renegotiate them in the face of changes to economic and fiscal 
expectations as well as technology changes. 
3.2 Transition 
It is important that new electrification planning and financing arrangements should be 
designed and implemented in such a way as to ensure that the transition is smooth. 
Firstly, this means that electrification should not be interrupted. Inevitably, if the 
distribution industry is rationalised, there is potential for electrification programmes to 
be disrupted. The introduction of industry rationalisation, together with a carefully 
considered electrification planning and financing strategy, should help to ensure that 
electrification continues during the transition phase. ~ 
Secondly, new proposals and the intr6duction of these proposals should take cognisance 
of the capacity constraints facing the industry. Partly this means that existing 
institutional strengths should be utilised, and proposals should therefore be wary of 
creating new institutions which require building from scratch. 
3.3 Clarity of institutional roles 
It is important that the separate functions related to electrification be clearly identified, 
and institutional roles clarified. The discrete activities within electrification include 
policy formulation, planning, financing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 
It is widely recognised that utilities are more effective if operational and investment 
decisions are left in the hands of utility managers. However, there are three important 
exceptions to this. The first occurs where utilities do not face competition and managers 
are able to abuse a monopoly position to pursue goals other than cost-efficiency. Under 
these circumstances economic regulation is required to bring pressures to reduce costs. 
The second exception occurs where environmental costs, particularly relating to 
electricity generation, are not included in the financial costs of the utility. In this case 
environmental regulation is required. The third exception occurs when the electricity 
industry is required to pursue the social policies of Government. Here explicit 
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mechanisms should be introduced to effect these policies without compromising the 
utilities' commercial objectives. 
The rationale for state intervention in the electrification programme is based on three 
factors. Firstly. electrification is an example of Government requiring utilities to act 
against their own immediate financial interests, thus requiring that policy guidelines be 
provided for utility managers in order to reconcile conflicting pressures. Secondly, the 
scale of subsidy resources is large - of the order of R 1.6 billion per annum. Although it 
is expected that these resources must be raised from within the ESI, they are still, in 
effect, public resources and Government has an interest in ensuring that these funds are 
a11ocated appropriately. Thirdly, monopoly distributors may seek to pass the costs of 
electrification directly onto customers, without adequately pursuing more cost effective 
implementation strategies. 
Regardless of the existence of such a clear rationale for Government intervention, it is 
still important to guard against excessive Government interference. Whilst Government 
must play a strong role in· designing overall electrification policies, it should leave the 
implementation of these policies, as far as possible, to the relevant state agencies and the 
utilities. The institutional and governance framework for electrification must therefore 
carefully divide responsibilities between the different agents involved. 
3.4 Financial transparency & pricing 
Transparency is critical where subsidies are applied. It is important that, as far as 
possible, such subsidies be made explicit and a system of accountability for the 
allocation of those subsidies be established. 
Where financing mechanisms rely on internal cross-subsidisation, such subsidies are 
difficult to account for. Consequently, it is preferable that alternative methods be used. 
The closer the allocation of subsidies to the fiscus, the more transparent the system is 
likely to be, and the more accountable it becomes (although possibly not more 
responsive). 
A complication with measuring and reporting the extent of subsidies arises where 
pricing policies allow a portion of the capital costs to be recovered through the tariffs. 
Under these circumstances, the level of subsidy required will inevitably be dependent on 
the rate of consumption growth - a variable notoriously difficult to predict. 
Consequently, it is important that resource allocation policies be closely linked to 
monitoring and evaluation exercises. 
Associated with financial transparency is the need to encourage cost-reflective tariffs. 
Although it may be expected that electrification mostly concerns only domestic tariffs, 
the possible need to raise cross-subsidies, as well as ensuring the financial viability of 
distributors and local government, demands that attention be paid to the entire tariff 
system. 
In principal, for reasons of economic efficiency, tariffs should be made as cost reflective 
as possible. Within any distribution business, some level of cross-subsidisation 
between and within consumer categories is inevitable. However, tariffs should be 
designed to reduce these within the constraints imposed by metering technology, and 
simplicity in tariff structure and accounting. 
3.5 Monitoring, evaluation and policy formulation 
The preceding discussion has, on a number of occasions. mentioned the importance of 
monitoring. reporting and evaluation. A system of monitoring and evaluation is 
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necessary not only to track progress, but also to allow ongoing and incremental 
adjustments to policies and implementation procedures. 
4. Electrification financing 
This paper is concerned with institutional and financing arrangements for electrification 
financing and planning. Although it is clear that many of the problems associated with 
electrification are linked to the existing structure of the distribution industry, it is 
proposed that an electrification planning and implementation system be designed to be 
compatible with a range of industry structure options. 
It is clear that electrification cannot be optimised unless the distribution industry is 
rationalised in some way. Whether this rationalisation takes the form of an integrated 
industry, regional electricity distributors, or some hybrid of these two options (for 
example, Eskom subsidiaries or joint ventures) should not affect the essence of the 
electrification planning arrangements. 
This section considers electrification financing requirements and mechanisms. The 
discussion will consider the types of financing requirements, the level of subsidy 
required, and the types of financing mechanisms which could be used. 
4. 1 Types of financing needs 
There are three types of financing required by distribution utilities. These are as 
follows: 
• Financing of commercial projects: This concerns the investments required in 
upgrading existing infrastructure and expanding the networks through projects 
where a reasonable rate of return can be expected. 
• Financing of non-commercial projects: Modelling of cash flows for household 
electrification indicates that, even in urban areas, subsidies are required. In rural 
areas, the required subsidy is likely to be 100% of capital costs, whereas in urban 
areas it may be only a portion of the capital costs. Thus, non-commercial projects 
will require an element of capital subsidy to enable utilities to undertake them. 
• Financing of operating losses: Many electrification projects, especially tbose in 
rural areas, will incur operating losses even if all of the capital is paid by grant 
finance. These losses must be met from some source of finance. 
It is recommended that the three financing requirements be met from , 
three different sources: commercial projects should be financed from 1 
capital markets and retained earnings; non-commercial investments 
should be partly subsidised through grant finance; and operating 
losses should be covered through cross-subsidies within the domestic 
customer base. 
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Loan finance for commercial projects 
11 
It is proposed that commercial projects be financed through the capital markets and 
retained earnings, which represents a continuation of current practices. Financing 
sources include the local and international bond market, and commercial bank loans. It 
is proposed that the Government should not raise finance on behalf of utilities. 
Complications may arise if the reformed industry structure creates new distribution 
entities, such as regional electricity distributors (REDs). Capital markets would be wary 
of new institutions and would be reluctant to subscribe to their bond issues, at least for 
the first five to eight years after their establishment, at least not without a substantial 
premium. Furthermore, the size of bond issues would probably be small (a minimum 
size of R200 million to R500 million is required to interest large institutional investors), 
and the liquidity would probably be poor (large institutions typically hold bonds for an 
average of six weeks, and an active market is required for this) (Moll 1996). 
Alternative sources of finance are loans from commercial banks and Eskom. If Eskom 
has an interest in the distribution industry (for example through shareholding in REDs), 
then there is potential for Eskom to use its resources to raise debt on capital markets at 
reasonable rates, and on-lend it to the distribution industry. H these loans are targeted at 
commercial projects, or at least complemented with grant funds to ensure financial 
viability, then Eskom would be able to expect its required return on these loans with 
some confidence. 
Should the capital markets fail to provide sufficient financing for commercial projects, 
possibly as a result of the difficulty in evaluation risk during a period of institutional 
change, then there may be a role for the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) 
to participate in the financing of such projects, at least during the transitional period. 
It is recommended that commercially viable projects should be 
financed through standard market sources, and possibly the DBSA. 
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Capital subsidy requirements 
Although there will be some projects where electrification is financially viable for the 
utility. in most cases subsidies will be required. The total subsidy required is equal to 
the negative net present value of the programme - estimated at (R20 billion) for 6.1 
million connections over twenty years - equivalent to (R3 250) per connection (Davis 
1995). This is close to the present value of all capital investment over the same period -
R23 billion - and the capital investments can be taken to approximate the subsidy 
requirements of the programme. Figure 4 shows these requirements over a 15 year 
period. 
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Figure 4: Subsidy requirements of the electrification programme 
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There are three possible mechanisms for providing grant finance to the electrification 
programme. These are 
• internal cross-subsidisation,· 
• a levy on electricity ,sales or production, or 
• allocations though the fiscus. 
Internal cross-subsidisation is the method currently used. One of its disadvantages is 
that it is not transparent, and hence difficult to control and account for. Further, it is 
only available to those utilities which control a sufficient revenue base and this results in 
geographical and technology biases. It is certainly possible to refine the system of cross-
subsidies, using the bulk supply tariff as the mechanism to spread resources between 
utilities and regions, but this, at best, is only an inadequate solution. Transparency is 
partially improved, but containing the financing within the electricity industry limits the 
accountability and entrenches the bias away from off-grid systems. 
The imposition of a levy on electricity production or sales would certainly generate 
sufficient resources, and Appendix B examines the level at which such a levy would 
have to be set. A dedicated levy essentially amounts to the establishment of an 
electrification fund, which may sit within the industry or in Government. Establishing 
controls over such a fund would inevitably require new institutional arrangements, or 
impose new and substantial responsibilities on existing institutions. Further, there is 
likely to be resistance to a fund which does not directly benefit those who contribute to 
it and the scheme may face opposition from the Department of Finance as well as 
electricity consumers. Thus. while a dedicated levy would improve transparency, its 
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creation and operation may face considerable political opposition and would require 
new institutional arrangements to be established. 
Funding of capital subsidies 
Internal cross-
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Within one Transfer pricing 
national distributor between utilities 
Fiscal 
allocations 
Dedicated 
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Govt. revenue -
taxes, dividends 
Government industry 
Figure 5: Options for funding capital subsidies 
Fiscal allocations have the advantage that they are transparent, directly accountable to 
the political heads of the appropriate line departments, and must compete directly with 
other claims on Government expenditure. Furthennore, they ensure that Government is 
directly responsible for providing the financial means for achieving its policies on 
electrification. Utilities become accountable for implementing the policies, but the 
political control is firmly in the hands of Government. Changes to policy can therefore 
be effected directly by varying the size. of the fiscal allocation. 
Given the current fiscal climate, it is important that the introduction of a new 
Government expenditure item should be matched with new forms of revenue generation. 
That is, the net effect on the fiscus of new expenditure and new revenue should be zero. 
New Government revenues can be generated by taxing the electricity industry which, to 
date, has been exempt from taxation and has passed profits from electricity supply either 
to other services (in the case of local authorities) or to consumers in the form of lower 
tariffs (in the case of Eskom). Appendix B shows that the imposition of companies tax 
and a 33% dividend policy would. raise considerable resources from Eskom - close to 
the total amount required for electrification:1 Since Government may wish to introduce 
such a tax and dividend policy on all public enterprises as part of its restructuring of 
state assets, electricity utilities may have to contribute to the fiscus anyway, regardless 
of electrification financing. 
It is recommended that subsidisation of capital expenditure on 
electrification be achieved through fiscal allocations and that a 
companies tax and dividends policy be applied to raise the necessary 
fiscal resources. 
A subsidy mechanism requires appropriate institutional arrangements to administer, 
govern and evaluate the application of the subsidy. Section 5 addresses these issues. 
Cross-subsidies for operating losses 
Many electrification projects will have to sustain operating losses. It is proposed that 
cross-subsidies, mainly within the domestic consumer base, be used to meet these 
losses. These subsidies will largely flow from urban consumers to rural consumers. For 
this mechanism to work, careful consideration must be given to the regional boundaries 
of REDs (if created). and the level of domestic tariffs. 
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At present, domestic tariffs vary widely. The NELF5 recommendations to cabinet 
proposed that there should be a single national domestic tariff (NELF 1994 ). At present, 
the prepayment tariff used in most electrification projects, at 25c/kWh. is much higher 
than the average domestic tariff, at 17c/kWh. This is largely due to the capital 
redemption portion built into the prepayment tariff. 
In the case of a national electricity distributor, cross-subsidies can easily be distributed 
across the country. If, however, REDs are created, complications may arise. It may be 
that the RED boundaries can be arranged to ensure that a· national domestic tariff can 
cover the cross-subsidy requirements of rural households in all REDs, without 
generating excess surpluses in any RED. It is unlikely that this problem will be solved 
through boundaries alone, however, particularly during a period when the rural customer 
base is expanding rapidly. If this proves to be the case then two solutions are possible. 
Either the concept of a national domestic tariff must be replaced by regional tariffs, 
thereby allowing REDs to set their domestic tariffs at a level to meet their revenue 
requirements; or an equalisation mechanism, such as differential bulk supply tariffs, 
must be designed. In principle either mechanism would suffice, but in practice the latter 
would likely prove difficult to regulate. 
It is recommended that cross-subsidies within the domestic conswner 
base be used to meet operating losses on electrification projects. 
Regional domestic tariffs should be set to raise sufficient revenue to 
do this. 
5. Institutional arrangements 
Institutional arrangements for the allocation of grant finance to the capital costs of 
electrification need to achieve the allocation of grants, the monitoring of the subsidised 
electrification programme, and the reformulation of electrification policies. Each of 
these is discussed below. 
5.1 Allocation of grant finance 
Institutional arrangements for the allocation of grant finance are inevitably closely 
linked to the. mechanism of finance adopted. Ultimately the choice is between a system 
which keeps the financial flows within the electricity industry, and one which allows 
funding to flow through the fiscus. 
National Elcclrification Forum 
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If the financing is maintained within the industry, then the allocation processes and 
associated institutions will depend on the structure of the industry. In the case of a 
horizontally integrated distribution industry, it is possible for cross-subsidies to be 
contained wholly within such a utility. If, however, the distribution industry comprises 
more than one utility (for example, a set of regional electricity utilities), it will be 
necessary to utilise a mechanism such as transfer pricing to manage financial flows 
between utilities. It would be unreasonable to expect the industry to determine the 
extent of such transfers itself, and hence it would be necessary to achieve these transfers 
through bulk prices. Given that the NER is responsible for regulating prices, it is likely 
that such a function would be best undertaken by the regulator (although this has the 
potential to undermine other functions undertaken by the regulator). 
The disadvantages of this system are that, firstly, transparency is not significantly 
improved and, secondly, Government's policy instruments remain limited. 
Furthermore, the high level of cross-subsidisation required would limit the extent to 
which other structural reforms in the electricity industry could be introduced. 
If the proposed system of fiscal allocations is adopted, then it will be necessary to decide 
which institutions should be involved in making the allocations. Here the choice is 
between the Department of Finance allocating funds to an existing agent, or allocating 
them to a new institution. The magnitude of the task should be emphasised. If grants 
cover 100% of the costs of rural electrification and 50% of the costs of urban 
electrification, then the total annual disbursement, at least in the next few years, will be 
of the order of R 1. 7 billion per annum. This is more than the R 1.4 billion which the 
DBSA disbursed in loans last year. 
Existing agents which may be considered for managing the allocation of grant funds 
include the DBSA, NER, and the DMEA. The DBSA is a development finance 
institution (moving towards becoming an infrastructure financing agency) and is 
probably well placed to manage electrification funding, although this responsibility may 
conflict with the DBSA's role as a loan finance institution. The NER has as one of its 
responsibilities the monitoring of electrification. The task of grant allocation would, 
however, be well beyond its current administrative capacity and would also tend to 
confuse its regulatory and monitoring functions with that of resource allocation. Lastly, 
the DMEA is the state department tasked with developing and executing Government's 
energy policies. Locating the function of grant allocation within this department 
therefore seems appropriate. It must be recognised though that in the current context of 
civil service reduction the DMEA faces significant capacity constraints, which may limit 
its ability to actually undertake the allocation function. 
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Given the capacity constraints within the DMEA the option of establishing a new 
National Electrification Agency appears attractive. When the practical difficulties of 
establishing a new institution are considered though this option appears less attractive. 
It is therefore concluded that the optimal arrangement is a combination of the DMEA 
retaining responsibility for allocation, perhaps within a Directorate: Electrification, but 
using an external resource to manage the operational processes. 
It- is recommended that grant finance allocatirm he the responsibility 
of the DMEA, which may choose to contract out the management of 
the allocations to a private, non-government or quasi-government 
agency. 
5.2 Monitoring and evaluation 
It is essential that the implementation of the electrification programme be monitored and 
the impact of the programme evaluated. Electrification policies should be continually 
reformulated to clarify the goals of electrification and to develop indicators to evaluate 
progress. 
There are a number of organisations who would be in a position to contribute to the 
monitoring and evaluation of the programme. Firstly, there are the utilities themselves 
who will be able to report on the implementation of electrification projects. Secondly, 
there is the NER, which has as one of its functions the monitoring of utilities' 
electrification programmes. Thirdly, there is the DMEA, which is concerned with 
evaluating the effectiveness and impacts of its electrification policies. Finally, should 
the above recommendation on the allocation of grant finances be implemented, there 
may be an agent which manages the operational aspects of electrification subsidy 
allocations. 
It is recommended that electrification be monitored from as many 
angles as possible, and that all appropriate agencies should 
contribute to this. The utilities the NER and the allocating agent 
should focus on monitoring implementation, whereas the DMEA 
should 1tf ve primary responsibility for evaluating the impacts of the 
programme. 
( 
5.3 Policy fonr1ulotion 
It is important to distinguish between those policy domains which concern Government 
and those which that lie within the jurisdiction of utilities, even though there will always 
be some grey areas which concern both Government and utilities. 
Government's electrification policy concerns relate issues such as the establishment of 
targets and guidelines for the allocation of grant finance. Electrification targets are 
closely linked to the availability of adequate funding, and it is Government's 
responsibility to set targets in conjunction with the establishment of suitable and 
adequate financing mechanisms. Having established such mechanisms, Government 
·needs to provide guidelines for the allocation of grant funds. 
It is essential that Government, through the DMEA, should integrate monitoring and 
evaluation outcomes into the overall policy formulation process. Thus the results of 
evaluations should be closely linked to the establishment of new targets and changes to 
resource allocation guidelines. 
Utilities should be primarily concerned with policy issues which relate to the 
implementation of the programme. This includes the selection of technology. 
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connection and tariff policies, as well as the details of network expansion p1anning. 
Government should, through the NER, ensure that utility implementation practices 
match Government's overall policies. 
It is recommended that the DMEA be responsible for formulating 
policies which establish the orientation of the electrification 
programme, whilst utilities should be responsible for establishing 
policies concerned with the implementation of electrification. The 
NER should be responsible for ensuring that the utilities' practices 
are in accord with Government's overall policies. 
6. Electrification targets and resource allocation guidelines 
This section discusses the level at which electrification targets may be set, and presents 
some proposals for resource allocation guidelines. 
6. 1 Electrification targets 
RDP electrification targets have already established until 1999, requmng a peak 
connection rate of 450 000 per annum. If these targets are met, this will increase the 
overall level of access to electricity from its current level of 50% to around 65%. At 
that point it is likely that most of the remaining three million unelectrified households 
will be in rural areas, and that rural access to electricity will remain below the 50% 
mark. 
The National Electrification Economics Study (NEES) medium scenario provides a set 
of connection rates which should ensure that overall levels of electrification reach 
approximately 80% by 2010 (assuming a household formation rate of 2%). These 
connection rates, and the resulting level of access to electricity, are shown in appendix 
A (Figure 7). It can be seen from this figure that an annual connection rate of close to 
200 000 is close to a household formation rate of 2% per annum, and this should 
therefore be taken as the minimum target level for household electrification. 
Although these figures comprise possible long term targets which Government may 
wish to set for the electrification programme, it is important that firm targets be set ifor 
the medium term only, and that targets be extended on an annual basis. This will allow 
Government to make changes to the pace of the programme, depending on a number of 
factors, such as the economic growth rate, the availability of grant finance, the financial 
performance of utilities, and the rate of household formation. 
It is recommended that electrification targets be established as pan of 
a five year rolling plan, initially based on the NEES medium scenario. 
Targets should be adjusted on an annual basis to take account of 
changing circumstances. 
6.2 Resource allocation guidelines 
Government should provide guidelines for the a11ocation of grant funds to 
electrification. It is proposed that the system operate on the basis of competitive bids 
for funding. These bids should be evaluated in terms of a set of criteria designed to 
orientate electrification towards achieving Government's policies. It is proposed that a 
combination of efficiency and equity considerations be adopted: 
Regional equity: Some funds should be allocated to ensure that electrification 
levels in all provinces reach certain targets. It is proposed that a minimum target 
of 50% access to electricity in all provinces by 2011 should be adopted. This rule 
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would favour electrification projects in rural areas. Appendix C details the 
number of connections and costs for each province in order to meet this target. 
Economic efficiency: Projects should be subjected to an economic evaluation to 
prioritise projects on the basis of net present value. This rule would favour low 
cost projects, and projects which are more closely linked to productive u~es of 
electricity. 
It is proposed that utilities be tasked with the responsibility of planning electrification 
programmes to meet certain minimum targets and that project selection and 
prioritisation be undertaken by these utilities in close consultation with provincial and 
local government. Utilities should then apply for public funding for these programmes 
through grant allocation channels. 
Bids for funding should be evaluated on the basis of the above two criteria, being equity 
and economic efficiency. It is likely that urban projects will benefit from this allocation 
procedure, as their costs are lower and their benefits are generally more diverse in urban 
locations. Well prepared development plans for rural areas wiJI clearly also receive 
attention for funding because of the equity criteria. 
It should be stressed that the allocation of grant funds should not be limited to electricity 
utilities, but should also be available to institutions disseminating non-grid applications 
and communities seeking funding for off-grid energy supplies. An important example is 
REFSA's6 solar home system dissemination programme, which should be eligible for 
subsidisation. Such agencies can compete directly for funding, and utilities may 
contract a portion of their funding allocations to these agencies in order to meet 
connection targets within funding constraints. This approach should result in innovative 
strategies and partnerships, leading to the overall stimulation of the renewables industry. 
In order to ensure that utilities adopt cost-minimising strategies, it is proposed that 
electrification grants cover only a proportion of the investment requirements in urban 
areas (so that utilities share the risk), and that capital limits be set per connection for 
grants in rural areas (to stimulate cost-minimising strategies). 
Grant allocations wiJI therefore encourage utilities and other agencies to put together 
innovative financing strategies. Combining grants with commercial financing and 
possibly even other grant sources (such as the clinic ;electrification funding available 
from the Independent Development Trust - IDT) should be encouraged. 
It is recommended that grant funds be allocated to electrification 
programmes using criteria which combine both equity and efficiency 
objectives. Allocations in urban areas should cover a proportion of 
capital costs, and in rural areas a cost per connection limit should be 
set. 
7. Conclusions 
It is apparent that existing institutional and financing arrangements in the electricity 
supply industry are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons. At present the programme is 
driven by targets which focus on the numbers of households electrified, and is seriously 
constrained by institutional and financing arrangements which distort the system of 
6 Renewably Energy for South Africa Pty Ltd. a subsidiary (public sector) company of the Central 
Energy Fund with the task of financing renewable energy projects m South Africa. REFSA's 
first task relates to the financing of solar home systems in rural areas. 
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resource allocation. Unless reforms are introduced, it is very possible that the 
electrification programme will falter after the year 2000, leaving many regions of the 
country with low levels of access to electricity. 
Electrification is expensive, capital intensive and cannot be financially viable without 
substantial subsidies. The net present value of an unsubsidised electrification 
programme, based on the NEES medium scenario, is in the region of negative R3 250 
per connection. The level of subsidisation required to make the programme financially 
viable varies between R 1 billion and R2 billion per annum over the next 15 years. 
Electrification already imposes costs of this order on the system, resulting in higher 
electricity tariffs than would otherwise be possible. This paper recommends that the 
position of state owned electricity enterprises be "normalised" as tax and dividend 
paying companies and that income derived from these changes be used to fund 
electrification. 
This paper has also proposed a set of institutional and financing arrangements which, if 
adopted, should ensure that electrification continues without adversely affecting 
utilities' financial positions. The recommendations assume that the distribution industry 
will be rationalised. Electrification financing should then be separated from the 
industry's structure through the establishment of subsidy mechanisms together with 
appropriate institutional arrangements. 
It is useful to compare the paper's recommendations against the five objectives for 
electrification policy set out in section three. Electrification incentives will be provided 
through a linked system of targets and capital subsidies. The proposed system of 
monitoring, evaluation and policy reformulation will also ensure that targets are flexible 
enough to respond to changing conditions. Although targets and financing mechanisms 
constitute a "top-down" approach to electrification, utilities will be encouraged to plan 
their electrification programmes in a demand-driven manner and allocations will be 
made on the basis of competitive bids. 
Incentives to reduce costs are provided through a combination of mechanisms. Firstly, 
capital subsidies in urban areas will contribute only a portion of the total investment 
required, thus reducing but not removing the utilities' risks. In rural areas,' a subsidy · 
limit will ensure that utilities explore cost-minimising options, particularly the option of 
solar home systems. Lastly, operating losses will have to be met through cross-
subsidies and the utilities will face the risk of the NER disallowing tariff increases if 
cost-minimising options are not explored sufficiently. 
As they stand, these recommendations constitute a system which moves away from the 
status quo, where the industry controls and manages the entire electrification 
programme, towards a system which involves the minimum of institutional changes. 
Care has been taken to minimise the creation of new institutions. Instead the 
recommendations have attempted to maximise the use of existing capacities and 
institutional resources within the ESI and Government. This should minimise disruption 
and ensure the continuation of progress with the electrification programme. 
One of the strengths of these recommendations is that they clearly identify the key 
functions involved in electrification and allocate these responsibilities to appropriate 
institutions. Utilities are tasked with implementing Government's electrification 
policies, and are relieved of having to take responsibility for the policy orientation of the 
programme and the allocation of large subsidies. Government is clearly tasked with the 
responsibility for developing policies and providing resources and financing 
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mechanisms to ensure that its policy objective of household electrification can be 
attained. 
The subsidisation of electrification through fiscal allocations will be substantially more 
transparent than the current system. It will be clear where electrification funds come 
from, and the electrification programme will have to compete with other development 
objectives for funding. Similarly, electricity prices will have most of the electrification 
subsidy element removed (although other subsidies, such as environmental components, 
will remain), and will therefore become more cost-reflective, thus providing better 
pricing signals to the market. The imposition of company taxes and dividends on the 
electricity industry will also remove a market distortion which currently favours 
electricity over other fuels. This will be particularly important as natural gas is 
introduced into the South African energy economy, and if private sector participation is 
ever contemplated in the electricity generation industry. 
Lastly, the recommendations include a system of monitoring and evaluation of 
_electrification that maximises the use of existing institutional strengths and natural 
institutional roles. The DMEA is tasked with the overall responsibility of ensuring that 
the outcomes of these evaluations are integrated into the policy formulation process. 
Given the size of this task it may be necessary to create a dedicated Directorate: 
Electrification within the department. 
Implementation of these recommendations will entail significant restructuring of 
financing and institutional arrangements, and clearly there is much detail to be filled in. 
Nonetheless the main objective of this investigation has been achieved in proposing an 
electrification policy framework and demonstrating· that it is both desirable and 
workable. In short, we believe that the implementation of these recommendations will 
lead to an appropriate distribution of power. 
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Appendix A 
Review of electrification to date 
Since the inception of Eskom' s electrification programme in 1991, household access to 
electricity has been substantially increased. The data presented below summarises key 
electrification statistics, targets set for the industry, and progress made to date. 
Electrification statistics 
It is estimated that at the end of 1995 there were close to 9 million households in South 
Africa with an average size of 4.6 people (NER 1996) .. Of these households, 50% were 
estimated to have access to electricity, equivalent to 46% of the total population. If 
' 'rural' is defined as all households outside proclaimed towns and cities, the rural 
population accounts for approximately half of the total population. Within this rural 
group, 21 % of households have electricity, although this is a significant increase since 
1994 when only 12% were estimated to have electricity. The provincial breakdown is 
given in Table 3. 
Table 3: National electrification statistics - December 1995 
Source: NER 1996 
Province Population' Households Percent' Unelectrlfled houses (000) Access to electrlclty' 
(000) (000) Rural Urban Rural Total Urban 
K/Natal 8 582 1 796 60% 172 849 1 021 
ECape 6625 1 393 68% 162 846 1 008 
Gauteng 7143 1 751 4% 375 31 406 
Northern 5.148 1 055 91% 34 715 749 
WCape 3 851 933 15% 95 72 167 
North West 3523 710 69% 69 382 451 
Free State 2 801 599 46% 116 163 279 
Mpumalanga 2968 589 70% 79 247 326 
N CaE!e 810 183 33% 29 34 63 
Total 41 451 9009 51% 1131 3339 4470 
1 
2 
3 
These figures exclude people living in institutions (hostels, old-age homes, etc.) 
Based on population ratios, not housing ratios: 
79% 
67% 
78% 
71% 
88% 
70% 
68% 
59% 
76% 
76% 
Rural Total 
14% 43% 
6% 28% 
54% 77% 
24% 29% 
47% 82% 
21% 36% 
33% 53% 
37% 45% 
47% 66% 
21% 50% 
; 
Based on housing ratios. Statistics based on RQpulation ratios are slightly lower. 
l 
The three provinces of KwaZulu/Natal, Northern Province and Eastern Cape all have f 
rural populations of over 4 million and together account for 70% of South Africa's rural 
population. These three provinces also have some of the lowest levels of rural 
electrification. It is anticipated that much of the rural component of the national 
electrification programme will occur in these provinces, together with North West 
Province. It is no coincidence that these provinces contain the bulk of the former 
homeland populations. 
It can be seen in Table 4 that the level of electrification in formal urban housing is 
relatively high - close to 80% nationally (in December 1994). It is in informal areas that 
urban electrification levels are low and it is expected that electrification in urban areas 
will be aimed primarily at these groups of residents. 
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Table 4: Breakdown of urban electrification by housing category - 1994 
Source: Eskom·NELF 1995 
Urban housing type Houses Electrified Not electrified 
Formal housing 3 500 000 2 700 000 800 000 
Institutions' 285 000 250 000 35000 
Informal housing 714 000 224 000 490000 
Informal backyard dwellings 147 000 36000 111 000 
Total 4 646 000 3 210 000 1436000 
1 Institutions refers to clinics, hospitals, prisons, etc. 
2 Total urban electrification had increased to 76% by the end of 1995 (NER 1996) 
Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest 1 000. 
23 
% electrified 
77% 
87% 
31% 
25% 
69%2 
Both dense and scattered rural settlements. which are located primarily in former 
homeland areas, have exceptionally low levels of access to electricity. Approximately 
one quarter of farmworkers on commercial farms have access to electricity, but many 
families without electricity reside on farms which have a supply point. The costs of 
extending electricity to this group are likely to be relatively low. 
The electrification of all schools and clinics has been identified as a priority by the 
Government - the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) white paper sets 
the target of electrifying all such facilities as soon as possible. The total capital cost of 
achieving this has been estimated at R850 million (Hambley et al 1995). 
It is estimated that there are approximately 19 000 schools without access to electricity 
(NER 1996) - equivalent to an electrification level of 24%. The equivalent figure for 
clinics is less certain - the NER ( 1996) states that there are some 2 200 clinics without 
electricity, whereas the IDT (1995) states that there are only 900 major clinics (as 
opposed to visiting points) without electricity (out of a total of 3 000 clinics in the 
country), and this figure includes all those sites where electrification is planned or 
currently being undertaken. The costs of electrifying all these sites is estimated at 
R50 million (IDT 1995). In addition, a further 250 new clinics will have to be 
electrified. 
Electrification progress to date < 
Eskom embarked on an electrification programme towards the end of 1991. The 
subsequent formation of the National Electrification Forum (NELF) led to the 
development of a set of scenarios for the implementation of a national electrification 
programme for the entire distribution industry. The mid-range scenario has been 
adopted by Eskom and ·the RDP as a set of targets for the distribution industry. The 
proposed annual numbers of household connections to be made, and the associated level 
of access to electricity are presented in Figure 7. Current commitments by Eskom as 
well as targets set by the Government, extend up to the year 2000. 
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Given the estimated rate of household formation, and the existing level of 
electrification, these targets should lead to an increase in access from 50% of dwellings 
in 1995 to 65% in 2000 (Theron 1995). However, most of the remaining unelectrified 
households will be in rural areas. If connections continue to be made at a declining rate 
(decreasing to 200 000 per annum in 2010), the national level of access to electricity 
should approach 80% by 2012 (Van Horen 1994). 
Table 5 summarises the achievements of the entire electrification programme to 
December 1995. 
Table 5: Electrification progress to December 1995 
Sources: NER 1996, Eskom 1995 and Foccaracio 1996 
1991/2 1993 1994 1995 
Eskom prepayment connections 177 000 209000 254000 313 000 
Local government connections 93000 91 000 130 000 118 000 
Other 21 000 16 000 35000 32000 
Fannworker connections 0 16000 17000 15000 
Total 291 000 332 000 436000 478 000 
Eskom capex (R million) R472m R584m R808m R1 055m 
Eskom capex per connection R3036 R2799 R3179 R3370 
Note: figures are rounded to nearest 1 000 
Total 
953 000 
432 000 
104 0,00 
48000 
1537000 
R2 919m 
A3162 
Responsibility for the electrification of schools and clinics has been shared between 
Eskom and the Independent Development Trust (IDT). The IDT has estimated that the 
total cost of electrifying all major clinics in the country is R50 million, and has allocated 
sufficient funds to achieving this. By July 1995, the IDT had electrified over 250 
clinics, equivalent to 30% of the total needs at the start of their programme. 
In 1995 Eskom electrified close to 1 000 schools (NER 1996). School connections are 
made in one of three ways: (I) as part of the general grid extension programme, and so 
funded by Eskom; (2) as part of the schools electrification drive, funded by Norwegian 
grants and the Eskom Community Development Fund; and (3) part ·of the off-grid 
electrification programme, funded by RDP grants. 
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Appendix B 
Revenue from taxation, dividends and levies 
It can be seen that grant finance requirements peak at over R2 billion per annum, and 
decline to between RI billion and R 1.5 billion over the next fifteen years. It should be 
stressed that at present these requirements are being met from within the electricity 
industry - Eskom has been spending around R 1 billion per annum, with municipal 
distributors also investing substantial amounts in electrification. In essence, the 
recommendation is to extract these resources from the industry, and reallocate them 
through other mechanisms. The options for extracting the resources include the 
following: 
• Company tax and dividends on Eskom and distribution authorities, 
• An electrification levy on electricity sales or production, 
• A combination of taxes/dividends and a levy. 
At present Eskom is exempt from paying tax in terms of section 24 of the Eskom Act, 
1987. Although accounts for taxation purposes are sl.ightly different from the financial 
statements published by Eskom, it is possible to make an estimate of Eskom' s taxable 
income. It can be seen from Table 8 that if Eskom paid tax, this would amount to 
around Rl.2 billion per annum7. If a dividends policy of 33% were applied, then a 
further R500 million would be raised (based on Eskom's 1995 accounts). 
Table 6: Estimates of tax/dividends from Eskom [R million] 
1995 1994 1993 1992 
Net income R 2 716 R 2 268 R 1 646 R 1 487 
Taxable income' R 3341 R 3014 R 1 832 R1699 
Tax@35% R 1169 R 1 055 R 641 R595 
Net income after tax R 1 547 R 1 213 R 1 005 R892 
' 33% dividends -i R 516 R404 R335 R297 
Total taxes & dividends R 1 685 R 1 459 r R976 R892 
Total taxes & dividends [1996 R] R 1685 R 1 575 R 1148 R1155 
Taxes & dividends I utility revenue 10% 10% 7% 7% 
1 Adding back provisions for nuclear waste management, management rationalisation, post-retirement 
medical benefits and 75% of provisions for arrear debts. 
Thus it can be seen that taxes and dividends would meet a large portion of electrification 
subsidy requirements, certainly in the latter half of the programme when funding 
requirements decline. . If non-Eskom distributors also pay taxes and dividends, then 
fiscal revenues will be even greater. Surpluses from municipal electricity departments 
have been in the region of RI. 7 billion per annum, and if this surplus was taxed it may 
be expected that substantial additional revenues would be received by the fiscus. 
The imposition of taxes and dividends on the electricity industry will have mixed 
implications for electricity prices. Although it may be expected that utilities would have 
It should be stressed that these are estimates only. Tax revenues would be sensitive to a number 
of factors, most important of which is the period over which assets could be depreciated for tax 
purposes. At present generation. transmission and distribution assets are depreciated over 25 
years. and if the Rccci,·er of Revenue allowed shorter life-times. then the tax payable would be 
decreased. 
EDRC & MEPC 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Recommendations on electrification policy 26 
to increase prices to meet financial targets, this increase would be offset by the reduced 
obligation to subsidise electrification. Thus. the necessary price increases would be 
reduced substantially. Assuming that taxation of Eskom and the payment of dividends 
is introduced together with public subsidies towards electrification (so relieving Eskom 
of capital expenditure in the order of R 1 billion per annum), then Eskom would have to 
raise approximately R700 million in additional revenue in order to maintain its 
debt:equity targets. This equates to an average price increase of 0.5c/kWh - an increase 
of 4.5% over the average price of electricity sold in 1995. 
If an electrification levy is applied to raise the necessary subsidy resources, this levy can 
either be applied at the generation or the retail level. The advantages of imposing the 
levy on generation are that revenues are relatively easy to collect, and secondly that 
Eskom may be in a position to absorb a portion of the levy, so reducing the effect on 
end-users. However, a policy of spreading the burden of the levy unequally among 
different consumer groups may be preferred, particularly as many industries are 
dependent on low electricity prices. Consequently, it is possible that Government may 
prefer that domestic consumers carry all, or a disproportionate portion of any levy. This 
policy may be implemented by opting for a levy on retail sales rather than generation, or 
by regulating the way in which utilities recover the cost of the levy from consumers. 
The levy can operate in one of two ways. A.fixed levy would impose a fixed percentage 
surcharge on all electricity sales. The levy would be calculated to ensure that, on 
average during the period of the electrification programme, all subsidy requirements are 
met. This would mean that in the early years of the programme the levy would raise less 
than the subsidy required, and in later years it would raise more. Debt would have to be 
raised to meet the short term requirements in excess of the resources generated from the 
levy. On the other hand a decUning levy could be designed to be high in the early years, 
and then decline to zero by the end of the programme. Any excess funds generated 
would be used to fund electrification requirements during the years when the levy is 
very low. 
Figure 9 illustrates the way in which these two levies would be implemented as a 
surcharge on all electricity sold. The declining levy starts at 1.28c/kWh - equivalent to 
an 11 % average price increase - ,and declines over time to 0.42c/kWh - a 3% price 
increase. If consumption grows at_ a slower rate than the 5% assumed, then the rate at 
which the levy declines will be slower. If a fixed levy is charged, then this would be set 
at 6.5% - a 0.78c/kWh charge. 
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A fixed levy should preferably be avoided, due to the need to raise additional finance. It 
is possible that during the years of deficit Eskom, or the DBSA, could raise debt and on-
loan to the distribution industry. However, this arrangement is probably unnecessarily 
complicated. 
The declining levy is preferred over the fixed levy, even though it imposes a relatively 
high burden in the early years of the programme. There is likely to be wider acceptance 
of a levy which is guaranteed to decline in real terms every year. 
It should be noted that an electrification levy and a tax/dividend policy on utilities are 
mutually exclusive options if substantial price rises are to be avoided. 
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North-West ----f 
R62m -10% 
Northern Province 
RI 15 million - 19% 
Average annual allocation 
= R600 mill (d&ounted) 
or R900 mill (undiscounted) 
Free State 
KwaZulu/Natal 
Rll3 m - 19% 
Eastern Cape 
R263 m - 44% 
Figure 10: Average annual allocations to provinces 
(discounting future allocations by 6% (real) per annum) 
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Appendix C 
Connections and costs required 
to reach 50% access to electricity in all provinces 
28 
In order to illustrate the scale of electrification, Figure IO show the number of 
connections which would have to be made on an annual basis if access to electricity in 
every province is to reach 50% by the year 20 I 0 . It can be seen that the Eastern Cape. 
KwaZulu/Natal and the Northern Province must undertake three quarters of connections 
(30%, 23 % and 21 % respectively). Electrification level in the Western Cape and 
Gauteng are already higher than 50%. 
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Figure 9: Number of connections required to reach 
50% access to electricity in all provinces 
Provinces 
(in same order 
as stacked bar) 
•N Cape 
•Free State 
• Mpurnlanga 
North West 
•Northern 
0Kwazu1u 
•ECape 
The capital expenditure required to reach these targets is shown in Figure 11. On 
average, the expenditure is R900 million per annum. Of this expenditure, the three 
provinces of Eastern Cape, KwaZulu/Natal and Northern Province account for 82%, and 
the Eastern Cape alone accounts for 44% of all expenditure. The provinces of North 
West, Mpumalanga and Free State receive a small but significant portion of the 
allocations, the Northern Cape receives only a very small portion and Gauteng and the 
Western Cape receive none at all. 
It should be noted that these figures exclude the possibility of a limit on costs per 
connection. Rural connection costs in the years after 2000 are likely to be well in excess 
of R5 000 and if limits are imposed this will have a significant effect on subsidy 
requirements. Such a limit will force utilities to use off-grid technologies m a 
substantial way, raise funds in addition to subsidy resources, or reduce their 
electrification programmes. Such a trade-off will inevitably be difficult to make. 
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